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FURTHER REFLECTIONS ON THE PARDONING POWER: REPLY 
TO HOSKINS AND DRINAN 
Chad Flanders* 
Galifianakis: "First question. In 2013, you pardoned a turkey. 
What do you have planned for 2014?" 
Obama: "We'll probably pardon another turkey". 1 
First, let me express my gratitude to the incisive comments of Zach 
Hoskins and Cara Drinan. I have long been a fan of Hoskins' s work, 
and his forthcoming book on the collateral consequences of punishment 
promises to be pathbreaking. 2 The influence of Drinan's scholarship on 
the pardoning power3 is evident in my original essay4 and her newer 
work on the Graham case has again inspired me in new directions in my 
research. 5 Their comments on my essay are important in their own right, 
and importantly for me, they have helped to clarify my own thinking. In 
my briefreply, I begin by restating the main points of the article. 6 I then 
try to expand on them, building off points made in both responses. 
I. 
I saw my article has having three major points: 
* Assistant Professor of Law, St. Louis University School of Law. Thanks to 
Christopher Bradley for comments on an earlier draft, and to Zach Hoskins and Cara Drinan for 
their excellent responses. 
I. Between Two Ferns with Zach Galifianakis: President Barack Obama, FUNNY OR DIE 
(Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.funnyordie.com/videos/18e820ec3f/between-two-fems-with-zach-
ga1ifianakis-president-barack-obama. 
2. ZACHARY HOSKINS, BEYOND PUNISHMENT? A NORMATIVE ACCOUNT OF COLLATERAL 
RESTRICTIONS ON OFFENDERS (forthcoming); see also Zachary Hoskins, Ex-Offender 
Restrictions, 31 J. APP. PHILOSOPHY 33 (2014) (discussing the numerous restrictions suffered by 
criminal offenders after they have paid their debts to society). 
3. Cara H. Drinan, Clemency in a Time of  Crisis, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1123 (2012) 
(arguing for increased use of  the pardon power). 
4. Chad Flanders, Pardons and the Theory of  Second-Best, 65 FL. L. REv. 1559 (2013) 
(defending the use of the pardon power but finding "strong moral limits on how it can be 
used."). 
5. Cara H. Drinan, Graham on the Ground, 87 WASH. L. REV. 51 (2012) (discussing 
Graham v. Florida and how lower courts and legislatures should implement the Supreme 
Court's decision); c f  Chad Flanders, The Supreme Court and the Rehabilitative Ideal, GA. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2015) (discussing the Supreme Court's reliance on rehabilitative theory in 
Graham). 
6. Flanders, supra note 4, at 1562-66.
51 
52 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW FORUM [Vol. 65 
(1) Pardons can be considered individually, but they can also be 
considered holistically.7 That is, not only can we look at a pardon of a 
particular person by itself, we can also consider a group of pardons, 
taken together: of each pardon, we can ask, is it justified? Was there a 
sound, rational basis for the granting of the pardon? Of a group of 
pardons, we can look and see if there are any patterns of bias or 
favoritism: was this selected for a pardon simply because of some 
arbitrary feature he or she possessed? 
(2) Even if each pardon may be justified individually, problems may
emerge at the level of a group of pardons. 8 A President may pardon 
people not only because they deserve it, but also because they are 
friends of the president. Or suppose a governor only commutes the 
death sentences of white inmates, leaving black inmates to be executed. 
Even if the commutations of the white inmates were justified, there are 
questions of justice we can raise about the racially selective nature of 
the executive's actions. 
(3) In some cases, the selectivity of the executive's acts of mercy can 
mean that it would be better if the executive (president, governor) did 
not pardon anyone rather than she pardon only some people and not 
others.9 I leave this question unanswered in the essay, but I at least 
suggest it is a possibility: it might be better that a governor pardon 
nobody than that he only pardon his friends, or members of a certain 
race, or pardon people randomly. There are values that can be violated 
at the level of pardons considered as a whole which at least weigh 
against and may even outweigh the justice of pardons considered 
individually. 
In my original article, I wanted to register the discomfort I had with 
the possibility of selective pardons, and the normative issues they raise. 
In the ideal world, everyone who deserves a pardon should get one. 
But, we do not live in an ideal world. At the very least, governors and 
other executives do pardon selectively, and in my essay I was trying to 
provide a way to frame our discomfort with that: cases in which 
individual pardons may be perfectly justified, but there's a pattern that 
seems normatively questionable. In those cases, we are actually dealing 
with two normative questions, not one. Therefore, the executive is 
vulnerable to objections on two fronts: first, were the pardons justified 
taken one by one and second, were the pardons distributed fairly? Haley 
Barbour's pardons were like that. He pardoned a lot of people, but he 
7. Id. at 1562. 
8. Id. at 1574. 
9. Id. at 1575. 
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pardoned people selectively. He wasn't consistent, and that was a 
normative failing in his pardons. Moreover, it is a normative failing 
even i f  all of the people he did pardon fully deserved it. 
I did not spend much time elaborating a theory of pardons per 
se. My larger point was that whatever your theory of justifying pardons 
individually was, there was still the issue of whether the pardons could 
be justified holistically. 10 This point allows me to make a small 
clarification. 11 Drinan quotes me as saying that I hoped my theory of 
pardoning would be "unobjectionable." 12 But here I was referring to the 
generic theory of pardons I was presenting, which was borrowed from 
the important work of Kathleen Moore. 13 That theory said that pardons 
could be justified when they were given for "good and sufficient 
reasons," 14 leaving open what those good and sufficient reasons would 
be. I wanted to lay out a theory of individual pardons that was relatively 
uncontroversial (and relatively underspecified) so that I could point out 
the further problem of pardons considered holistically. I did not expect 
my claim about holistic pardons to be uncontroversial and 
unobjectionable: far from it! I expected it to be controversial. 
II. 
Hoskins's response is generally sympathetic, but he raises a 
compelling point. 15 Hoskins wonders why we shouldn't always pardon 
the person who deserves it, even when others similarly situated might 
not be pardoned. Hoskins writes, " i f  an executive obtains compelling 
evidence of a prisoner's innocence, for instance, we may believe justice 
demands a pardon. In cases of mandatory pardons, it is difficult to see how 
the cause of justice overall is furthered by refusing to do what justice 
demands in particular cases (i.e., refusing to pardon some innocent people) 
merely to avoid an unfair distribution of pardons overall." 16 I think I agree 
with this particular example, and said so in my article. 17 But at the same 
time, it is important that there is still something lost, if the governor does 
10. Id. at 1572. 
11. Cara H. Drinan, Where Pardons Are Concerned, Second Best May Not Be So Bad
After All: A Response to Chad Flanders, 65 FLA. L. REV. F.  29, 31 (2013). 
12. Id. at 30. 
13. Flanders, supra note 4, at 1565-70; see generally, KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, 
PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST ( 1997). 
14. /d.at3.
15. Zachary Hoskins, Problematic Pardoning Patterns: Response to Chad Flanders,
Pardons and the Theory o f  the 'Second-Best,' 65 FLA. L. REV. F.  17, I 7-18 (2013). 
16. Id. at 18. 
17. Flanders, supra note 4, at 1594, n. 130. 
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not also pardon some other person who is innocent, and for reasons that are 
discriminatory or arbitrary. This, in a way, was the modest aim of my 
article: to show that we are not done evaluating an executive's pardon 
when we have determined whether the pardon had "good and sufficient 
reasons" behind it. We also have to look at the other people pardoned, or 
not pardoned. Only then can we look at the justice of the governor's 
actions as a whole. 
Will it ever be the case that an unjust distribution o f  pardons will 
mean that no one should be pardoned? I press this possibility in my 
article, and Hoskins makes a helpful suggestion. In my article I made in 
passing a distinction between mandatory and permissible pardons, and 
Hoskins comments that "the distinction may be more central to [my] 
central thesis" than I acknowledge. 18 Hoskins wants to say that it will be 
always right to grant mandatory pardons, regardless o f  distribution 
patterns, whereas with permissible pardons we may be right to be more 
sensitive to patterns o f  distribution. This may be right, but I would need 
to hear more about what counts as mandatory and what counts as 
permissible in pardoning. I also believe that in the case o f  some minor 
mandatory pardons, 19 we really ought to be sensitive to distribution. 
People may be owed a pardon, but i f  for some reason we can't or won't 
pardon everyone who is similarly situated, we may have good 
normative reasons to hold off on the selective pardoning when the 
stakes are relatively low. 
Drinan raises many excellent points in her response, but the key one 
seems to be that I focus too much on "batch" pardons, like the 
Barbour's mass pardons, and not on "regular clemency grants."20 As she 
writes, 
Routine exercise of  the pardon power theoretically should 
normalize the process for the public, which may be 
otherwise wary o f  it, and rationalizing its operation should 
enhance fairness. Yet, i f  Professor Flanders is correct that 
"sometimes a pardon is wrong only when compared to 
other instances o f  pardons granted or not granted," regular 
exercise of  the pardon power is very problematic. 21
I think this is correct in one respect: when a governor pardons people 
en masse, it is easier to assess those pardons as a whole. We can see 
who gets pardoned, who doesn't get pardoned, and whether there are 
18. Id. at 19. 
19. Suppose that a governor believes that it is morally wrong that ex-felons who have 
served their term are denied the right to have a fishing license, but he only pardons white ex-
felons (so that they can now fish) and not black ex-felons. I would think it might be better 
normatively that he pardon nobody, than that he pardon unjustly. 
20. Drinan, supra note 11 at 30. 
21. Id. 
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any normatively objective patterns in the pardoning. It is harder to see 
the distribution of pardons when we have a governor (her example is 
Robert J. Ehrlich Jr., former Governor of Maryland) who pardons one at 
a time, over a longer period of time, and not all at once in a "batch." 
What do we say about such cases, which happen over many years? 
Two things. We can still assess one pardon by itself, not only by 
reference to whether that pardon is deserved (Was the person innocent? 
Did he reform himself? Is he suffering too much?), but also relatively to 
other people who are similarly situated, even when the pardons are 
separated in time. Every pardon works against the background of other 
people who are not pardoned. If one person is pardoned, and another is 
not and that person is similarly situated, we can criticize the executive's 
only pardoning one person. This suggests another point: when a 
governor pardons one person, he or she should be setting down a 
precedent, or a rule: anyone in the present or in the future who is like 
the person I pardoned also deserves a pardon. Pardons, in other words, 
should be principled, not just in the one case, but across all cases, 
including cases yet to come. 
Consider President Obama's recent pardon of eight people who had 
been sentenced to longer terms because they were found guilty of 
offenses involving crack as opposed to cocaine. "I am commuting the 
prison terms of eight men and women who were sentenced under an 
unfair system," Obama wrote in a statement. 22 "Commuting the 
sentences of these eight Americans is an important step toward restoring 
fundamental ideals of justice and fairness."23 Were Obama's pardons 
,iust considered individually? Probably, or let's at least stipulate that 
they were. Were they just considered holistically? One of the people 
pardoned, the news story notes, was a cousin of Massachusetts 
Governor Deval Patrick, an Obama supporter and friend.24 Was 
favoritism a factor in the pardon of Patrick's cousin? Probably. Should 
that affect our normative assessment of that pardon? Maybe, especially 
if others similarly situated were not pardoned. 
Note that Obama can cure the hint of favoritism in his pardons by 
pardoning more people who are similarly situated, of which there are 
many. The story quotes a spokesperson from Families Against 
22. Erin Fuchs, Obama Slams 'Unfair' Drug Laws as He Commutes The Sentences o f  8
Crack Offenders, BUSINESS INSIDER, (Dec. 19, 2013, 3:07 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/barack-obama-commutes-8-sentences-2013-12. 
23. Paul Lewis, Obama Commutes Sentences of  Eight Crack Cocaine Offenders, THE 
GUARDIAN (Dec. 19, 2013) at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/19/obama-reduces-
sentences-eight-crack-cocaine. 
24. Matt Viser & Tracy Jan, Patrick's Cousin Gets Presidential Clemency, THE BOSTON 
GLOBE, (Dec. 20, 2013 ), http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2013/ 12/19/president-
obama-commutes-drug-sentence-deval-patrick-first-
cousin/9ROGlmHrTeRziiokQsRZOM/story.html. 
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Mandatory Minimums as saying they were pleased with the pardons, 
but that "ftlhe bottom line, however, is that there are several thousand 
more where they came from. "25 If Obama continues to pardon, regularly 
and consistently with the principle he announced with his first "batch" 
of pardons, he avoids the claim that he is pardoning favorites. If he only 
pardons sporadically, he opens himself to criticisms of selective 
pardons. Again, we can assess Obama's pardons holistically, both with 
reference to those he didn't pardon (and those he did) in the present, and 
with reference to those he should pardon, going forward. 
I too, with Drinan, wish that pardoning would become more regular, 
more of an accepted part of the criminal justice system rather than an 
occasional thing. In a criminal justice system as ours, which falls very 
far short of the ideal, pardons are (somewhat regrettably) necessary 
parts of the system. They are necessary to remove injustices that for 
whatever reason can't or won't be addressed by the other branches of 
government. We need to be consistent in remedying those injustices, to 
avoid the risk of creating at least the perception of even greater 
injustices. Therefore, we need a more aggressive use of the pardoning 
power. We also, at the same time, need a principled one. 
25. Lewis, supra note 22. 
